Celtic 3-0 Rangers: Lennon champions 3-5-2 in comfortable derby victory

Posted on April 29, 2012 by

As far as the ‘meaningless’ type of Glasgow derby goes, the latest had reasonable worth attached for both clubs. Rangers, defiant on the brink of liquidation, are clinging on to competitive significance in Scotland. Celtic meanwhile, still have a number of demons to bury.

Celtic Lineup

Celtic 3-4-1-2

Neil Lennon made four changes to the side that beat Motherwell 3-0 last week with Glenn Loovens, Scott Brown, Adam Matthews and Georgios Samaras coming in for Thomas Rogne, Ki Sung-Yeung, Cha Du Ri and Pavel Brozek.

James Forrest is still out with that ankle problem, and there was no room for the returning Beram Kayal or Kelvin Wilson.

The only difference to last week’s (3-4-2-1) system was the positioning of Gary Hooper, who instead of dropping deeper alongside Kris Commons, was more overtly stationed higher up the park. The front 3 are becoming increasingly difficult to define – simply because Lennon is encouraging vertical movement between the lines in an effort to destabilise the familiar deeply entrenched defences.

Rangers Lineup

Rangers 4-3-3 / 4-5-1

Ally McCoist stuck to the same team and system as used successfully against Hearts last week at Tynecastle.

A standard 4-3-3 defending as 4-5-1, which also bears similarities to the formation used in the last derby at Ibrox.

This time round, Rangers were without key players Sasa Papac and Steven Davis, with Kyle Lafferty and Steven Naismith also long-term absentees. Kirk Broadfoot and Jamie Ness however, returned from injury to make the match squad.

4-3-3 vs 3-5-2

Celtic started with a cheeky trick – lining up apparently in a 4-1-2-1-2 (diamond) prior to kick-off (with Wanyama behind Brown and Ledley). They immediately reverted to 3-5-2 and gained the upper hand.

Apart from dealing with the unfamiliar Celtic 3-5-2, Rangers’ main concern was that Lee McCulloch has isolated from the off with Loovens doing well to keep him out of trouble. As an experienced scrapper, his focus turned to manipulating the ref rather than taking on his marker directly.

Rangers’ 4-3-3/4-5-1 is generally considered a ‘hard’ counter to a 3-5-2, in that a lone striker creates a numerical disadvantage for the three-man defence. 1 striker taking up 3 centre-backs is a waste of resources. Celtic circumvented this tactical situation, by using the ‘outer’ centre-backs quite cleverly. Like against Motherwell, Wanyama (and to a lesser extent Mulgrew) took up very wide positions (albeit very aware of not completely abandoning the central defender and leaving a 1v1).

If Wanyama goes head-to-head with one of Rangers’ three forwards, then the nightmare situation would be a 3 v 3. There must be a spare man, every other attacker must be picked up, therefore Celtic depended on the forwards defending from the front.

The image to the right, for example shows Wanyama (bottom right) accomodated by Little. Lee Wallace pushes for an overlap and is tracked by Adam Matthews (far right).

On the other side, Charlie Mulgrew can’t pickup Sone Aluko or that would leave 3 vs 3 at the back. Therefore Izaguirre does this task instead.

So finally, if Kyle Bartley attempts to create an overlap (top-left), it is one of the forwards (here, typically would be Samaras, on the right it’d be Commons) who has to track the run of the full-back.

Rangers lacked this attention to overlaps. Where Celtic looked to maximise numerical advantages, Rangers were typically committed to defending with 4 of the back-line plus the defensive midfielder – 5 vs 3.

This also exacerbated the problem of Rangers’ full-backs being unable to get up the park and exploit Celtic’s 3-5-2.

If Bartley (for example) leaves the back 4, Dorin Goian would potentially be left with a 1 vs 1 situation on the counter – again an unacceptable risk. Bartley and Wallace were caught in two-minds - barrel forward and expose their two centre-backs to a front-three, or sit-back and let the Celtic wing-backs attack.

Killer opener

Rangers’ “weaker” sides (be it on paper or financially) have in recent times ‘kept up’ with Celtic through various strategies. The most infuriating for Celtic, has been Rangers’ solid defence. Ally McCoist has been able to keep largely intact the same back four that Walter Smith made safe use of in his final season.

Strange then, that Rangers conceded an incredibly soft early opener. Commons racked up his 10th assist in 13 starts by lofting in a corner to Mulgrew at the far post. Mulgrew’s run was untracked from well outside the box with nobody paying attention – criminal defending to leave an opposition centre-back unguarded.

By 30 minutes, Celtic’s dominance was absolute resulting in the second. Brown – doing what he does best – scrapped for the ball, hit it on to Hooper whose first touch was difficult, and second put Commons through on goal.

Bartley rightly took a lot of flak for failing to make more of the covering slide-tackle (having come across from the right-back position), but Rhys McCabe was caught ball-watching as Commons quietly escaped, delicately dinking the ball over Alan McGregor.

Rangers change shape, if not run of play

Rangers post-30 minutes

The traditional 4-3-3 vs 3-5-2 paradigm had failed McCoist – the idea the 3 centre-backs defending 1 striker was a waste of bodies.

This was because Celtic’s outside centre-backs were confident enough to progress up the pitch – they are after-all midfielders by trade.

McCoist made moves to end this freedom, and also to provide more support to McCulloch – by going 4-4-2 and pushing Aluko up. (A similar change was also made in the last derby).

It also – on paper – deals better with marauding wing-backs – but now the discomfort was in the central areas. Celtic, for once, had a numerical midfield advantage and it became much easier to control the match (although with less offensive intensity).

Second half stroll

At 2-0 Rangers were finished, and it seemed a question of how many for Celtic? The central numerical disadvantage may have complicated matters for the third, as McCabe was caught in possession having zero options (both centre-backs were marked ). Commons stole the ball, fed Samaras, whose through-ball was perfectly weighted for Hooper to hammer in the final nail.

McCabe generally had had an impressive match, but these two lapses in concentration effectively cost Rangers two goals, and he was substituted moments later.

What followed was the tamest ending to a derby in a long time. Bartley predictably threatened to incite trouble with a couple of provoking challenges, but Rangers were finished and Celtic comfortable.

Conclusion

Neil Lennon’s decision to go 3-5-2 (or more accurately 3-4-1-2) was a surprise – but it proved pivotal and nostalgic. There are parallels with Martin O’Neill’s celebrated system – with Izaguirre the left-sided Agathe with superior delivery. And while O’Neill’s later iterations saw more “physical” players used behind the striker (Chris Sutton, Stan Petrov, or other fringe players) the use of Commons in the hole was inspired, harking back to some of Lubo Moravcik’s more memorable displays.

That is what the whole system was about – getting Commons causing damage in that number 10 position – and Lennon has been pursuing this method (as argued on this blog) for a very long time. An assist for the opener, a goal for the second and winning the ball in opposition territory for the third, is everything Lennon would’ve wanted.

There were further successes – the use of the wing-backs and the dynamic front-three – but there are still question marks over certain aspects of the system. The role of the central midfielders becomes strictly industrial, somewhat limiting the attacking potential and excitement of Joe Ledley, (on occasion) Scott Brown or, say, Ki Sung-Yeung.

The use of the outside centre-backs is also suspiciously open to exploitation. Wanyama was essentially a right full-back, making for a uniquely unheard of system.

McCoist’s attempt of using two strikers is probably the unconventional ‘best way’ of dealing with such a system, but it’s now too late to find out. The next real test is at the end of July through European qualification. Something says there’s a lot more twists and turns – for both teams showcased today – before we’ll find out if this 3-5-2 is sustainable for the future.

What matters now is that Celtic are champions. And what a nostalgic, fluid attacking display – against Rangers no less – to top off this most remarkable season.

Posted in 2011/12, Rangers | Tagged , , | 21 Comments

Motherwell 0 – 3 Celtic: Champions get experimental with 3-4-2-1

Posted on April 24, 2012 by

With all competitions decided, it was only natural for Neil Lennon to try out new ideas; new systems and players on the fringes. In Sunday’s 3-0 victory at Motherwell, he found success on both fronts – a brand new formation, and a match-winning brace from youth product and debutant Tony Watt.

Celtic Lineup

Celtic 3-4-2-1

Pavel Brozek, still clinging on to hope for a place in Poland’s Euro 2012 squad replaced Georgios Samaras to lead the line. There were wholesale changes at the back with Scott Brown, Kelvin Wilson, Glenn Loovens and Mikael Lustig all dropping out. Thomas Rogne and Victor Wanyama came in to make a back three with Charlie Mulgrew, while Emilio Izaguirre and Cha Du Ri were used as attacking wing-backs on either side.

Frazer Forster was benched to allow Lukasz Zaluska some gametime, and of the outfield substitutes, only Anthony Stokes would not be considered “fringe”.

Motherwell Lineup

Motherwell 4-3-3

Motherwell were missing their most effective player in Keith Lasley, as he along with Jonathan Page were suspended. Steven Hammell and Lasley’s partner in crime, Steve Jennings returned from suspension.

Stuart McCall continued with the 4-3-3 formation that his side have persisted with for the past 2 seasons, so little surprise there for Lennon.

Differences with O’Neill’s 3-5-2

Lennon has briefly flirted with 3-man defences in his 2 seasons in charge, and clearly a lot has been taken from his time under Martin O’Neill, and everyone fondly remembers that successful system on the road to Seville (Paul Lambert, incidentally, frequently uses a form of 3-5-2 at Norwich).

But this was far removed from O’Neill’s vintage. Starting at the back, on either side of the ’3′, Lennon was using two exceptionally gifted ball-playing defenders in Mulgrew and Wanyama. On the flanks, two out-and-out speed merchants in Izaguirre and Cha (O’Neill’s was generally one-sided in using Alan Thompson – who wasn’t really a wing-back or full-back).

Indeed, Cha was deployed so far forward that Wanyama was used effectively as a conservative full-back, leaving the 3 centre-backs against Motherwell’s 3 forwards.

Pros and Cons

Lennon’s ambitious formation added more bodies to the midfield and forward areas, and so Motherwell’s central defence (along with holding midfielder Steve Jennings) had an uncomfortable afternoon. The full-backs had two speedy and athletic customers in Izaguirre and Cha, but the main problem was with the movement of Commons and Hooper. Commons acted as a number 10 playmaker, and Hooper pushed up (as a classic number 9) or more regularly dropped deeper (as a false 9).

Motherwell dealt with this in two ways – Jennings had to track two tricky runners, or Tim Clancy having to ‘step-out’ – clearly a method of Lennon’s to try to disorganise or poke holes in the standard two centre-backs/one holder triumvate.

Unfortunately, this didn’t work as well as was hoped for. Clancy didn’t mind stepping out to an extent – as it got the point that Hooper was dropping into the rest of Motherwell’s midfield – either that or dropping so deep as to become ineffective as a player (at one point gifting  Humphrey with a great chance).

Hooper is an excellent and improving striker, but there becomes a breaking point in terms of depth of playmaking.

The system also found the very best of Cha and Izaguirre, albeit the former continuing to suffer from being poor in the final third, and the latter still relatively unfit.

Taking Cha-nces

Shortly after Hooper’s mishap, Wanyama created a great chance for Brozek – again underlining Celtic’s 3 vs 3 at the back, because it works both ways. Once away from his “opposite number” Omar Daley, he had the freedom of the pitch to stride forward and play a through-ball to Brozek, whose finish was sadly rushed.

As the injured Ki was replaced by Paddy McCourt (retaining the unlikely centre-midfield role), Wanyama almost repeated the feat, setting up Commons who couldn’t get enough accuracy on his shot to trouble Darren Randolph.

On the stroke of half-time Commons and Brozek combined in an example of their vertical movement and interchanging unsettling the Motherwell defence, with the Poles shot hit against the keeper’s legs and out. It’s a shame for Brozek who was getting into the right positions, he was just lacking the bit of luck required to break his duck.

Celtic didn’t particularly recapture the creativity of the first-half during the opening 15 minutes of the second period, barring for a squandered Cha chance that is the Korean in microcosm. McCourt’s delicious through-ball was put into the path of Cha’s Olympic-sprinter-esque burst of pace, but the final ball was inexplicably useless, rolled gently into the goalkeeper’s hands.

Tony Watt

Despite Brozek’s promising performance, Tony Watt replaced him on the hour and within 3 minutes and 19 seconds had managed to achieve what the Polish international couldn’t.

By then Henrik Ojamaa had replaced Daley in a like-for-like change, but in the short space of time until the goal the Motherwell sub was simply not paying any attention to his opposite number, Wanyama, at all. Unsurprisingly, it was the same overlap and cross (with Cha tying up Hammill) used earlier, and though Watt’s finish was adroit, it was just as much the quality of the cross that resulted in the goal.

Another 2 and a half minutes later, Watt had the ball in the back of the net again. But this time, it was a success for Hooper’s movement into deeper areas, as the following slideshow explains in ugly fashion:

4-4-2s

Motherwell quickly went 4-4-2, not only in the hope of providing a bit of support to Higdon but also in an effort to double-up on the flanks more successfully. But the damage was done and Celtic could smell blood. Commons’ influence was increasing, but sadly he could not open his scoring account for the season, in what has become an incredible swing in form from last season. It’s only here, 50+ matches into Celtic’s season that he appears to be nearing his old self.

Celtic too, switched to 4-4-2 although it’s not clear why. The best explanation might be to find Lustig room in the team (without removing Cha), but it may have been to again go man-to-man with Motherwell; not that it mattered with minutes remaining.

McCourt (now playing on the left, with Wanyama centre of midfield) found Cha at the back-post to back it 3-0, truly ending the contest.

Conclusion

While not too much can be garnered from this performance in the long-term, it’s just another example of Lennon searching for a new system, an alternative to his trademark ‘lop-sided’ 4-4-2. The proposed formation not only has to provide defensive solidity (as in Europe, Celtic will be facing superior sides), but also room for creative and attacking players.

A 3-4-2-1 (or other variants on 3-5-2) ticks some major boxes. It puts a real emphasis on the wing-backs, and arguably Celtic’s best player in Emilio Izaguirre. It has flexibility, with Mulgrew and Wanyama both technically proficient and able to adapt into different roles quickly.

Finally the system can (arguably) provide a solid foundation for a dynamic front-three – most significantly to include a number 10 – a type of player that Lennon has long been coveting.

As far as experiments go, it was a fine success. And Watt’s quickfire double was the icing on the cake.

Posted in 2011/12, Motherwell | Tagged , | 5 Comments

Celtic 1 – 2 Hearts: Hearts frustrate dominant Celtic, with referee blunder deciding match

Posted on April 15, 2012 by

Hearts struck lucky after being dominated for the majority of the Scottish FA Cup semi-final against Celtic. In a brief attacking spell, Rudi Skacel took the lead for Hearts. Celtic rallied to equalise, but Euan Norris handed Hearts victory, making a horrendous mistake in awarding a penalty.

Celtic Lineup

Celtic 4-4-2 diamond. Ki providing width on right, Commons struggling for room between the lines.

As per the tictactic match preview, Neil Lennon decided to (largely) keep the same team-sheet as last week’s 6-0 win over Kilmarnock. Where he diverged from the preview, is that the 4-3-3 / 4-1-2-1-2 formation was retained – a bold move when faced against an expected 5 man midfield.

Also as expected, Mikael Lustig was the only change, coming in for the ill Adam Matthews.

Hearts Lineup

Hearts 4-4-1-1 (in possession)

Sergio had two changes to make following his sides victory over Dunfermline. Andy Webster came in for the injured Jamie Hamill. As a result, Darren Barr moved into the midfield with Webster partnering Marius Zaliukas at the back.

The other change was at the top, with Stephen Elliott preferred to Gary Glen, with Craig Beattie meanwhile only fit for the bench.

Hearts 4-1-4-1 (without the ball)

But the shape was subtly different from the expected 4-2-3-1, and really not by much. In fact there’s little distinction between the “trendy” 4-2-3-1 and the old-fashioned 4-4-1-1. Hearts were very clearly defined with and without the ball, or respectively 4-4-1-1 and 4-1-4-1, dependent on the fluid movement of Barr and Skacel.

Celtic ascension

In what has been a recurring theme this season, the very early period of the match was interrupted by moment(s) of madness from the Celtic defence, with Kelvin Wilson and then Charlie Mulgrew guilty of lazy, dangerous play at the back.

The team did, however, makes strides after that point. With the Jambos sitting so deep, Celtic’s back four (and sitting midfielder Brown) had a leisurely time passing the ball around, and getting forward.

Such was the freedom that even Glen Loovens was able to make dashes forward. This isn’t as silly a tactic as one might think –  as opposed to a full-back for example who has a strict, defined man-marker, Loovens (or whatever spare centre-back) has no man-marker, and therefore can make “surprise” forays forward. The fatal flaw being, that Loovens is woeful with the ball at his feet.

The dilemma for Hearts was in providing support for Elliott, the attacker would be leaving a man free. So for example, Andy Driver coming off Lustig makes for an easy Celtic counter down the right. Hearts therefore were too cautious to cause meaningful attacks, preferring defensive sturdiness. As outlined in the preview, Hearts only real threats going forward were from set-pieces – with a quick fire 2 corners to each side in just the opening 10 minutes.

With 1st half possession favouring Celtic to the tune of 70%, Hearts strategy became clear (also touched upon in the preview). Like Kilmarnock, Hearts needed to shut Celtic out for as long as possible, and depend on getting fairly fortunate with respect to a number of variables – taking one of the few opportunities that should arise, letting Celtic self-destruct (as has so often been the case this season), or rather hopefully, hope for a bit of good-luck when it comes to refereeing (again, as has so often been the case).

By half-time, Hearts were outrageously under the kosh, barely getting out of their own half; never mind mounting an effort on goal. Celtic weren’t making enough of their possession, but still had some good chances. Hooper should’ve done better with a glancing header (after Mulgrew was allowed to make his way up the park), and Commons also could’ve done more picking up on a slack pass. Biggest chance of all fell to Ki, who unmarked at the back post fired a close range header against the post.

Sergio had to make a change or wait for Celtic to find the breakthrough….

Second half – Second striker

Perhaps in a good example of “power play” in football, Sergio made a change that devastated the by now fairly complacent and comfortable Celtic defence. A switch to two strikers – and the inform Craig Beattie no less.

Hearts 4-4-2 diamond (matching Celtic)

The obvious question is – with a 5 man midfield already struggling defensively, how can introducing another striker possibly help? Two things: the first, by mimicking Celtic’s 4-1-2-1-2 (4-4-2 diamond), it was a simple case of “everybody has a man”, with no “spare” Celtic players. The second, is part of the “power-play” idea, and Sergio has to be given credit in this regard. His players were fired up after the interval, and put in the best, most dangerous 10 minutes from either side. Quite simply – attack is the best form of defence.

The change took Celtic by surprise, with Hearts overloading in attack. With the defence unsure as to who to pick up, Beattie made the difference (albeit with a rather fortunate deflection) with Skacel picking up the loose ball to score. A good Hearts attack but pretty slack defending at any stage of a competition.

Hearts capitalised on the momentum, Skacel coming close again with a superb ranged drive, and Celtic for a moment looked close to conceding again but the “power-play” would end. Hearts grabbed their big chance, so it (initially) looked like a case of battening down the hatches.

Reverting to type

The onus was returned to Celtic to step up and create. Ki was having a decent game out of position(ish) on the right of the diamond, and was surprisingly wide for much of the match (given that technically, he had to cover Danny Grainger’s forward movement). But Celtic were decent going through that side, Ki linking up well with Lustig, and to a lesser extent Commons and Hooper.

Brown, Ledley and Samaras were quieter, with the latter removed for Anthony Stokes on the hour. The worrying consequence at this stage, was with no “spare” players at the back, Celtic were too often resorting to long, hopeful passes. And with no target to aim for, this initially proved to be a waste.

Where Hearts were most successful, and this applies to the whole match, was in quieting Celtic’s front 3 (plus Ledley). Commons was essentially marked out the game by Barr, and generally when the opposition play so deep, Samaras is a great option in the air. But he was comprehensively kept quiet, and didn’t even have the room to use his dribbling pace.

But with Hearts tiring, Celtic ramped up the pressure with Stokes looking dangerous through the inside-left channel. In a carbon copy of his earlier miss, Ki drove a free header against the back post – two glaring misses from arguably Celtic’s most productive midfielder.

There was a notable propensity among the Celtic team to get crosses in early – besides it’s easier for the likes of Stokes and Hooper to dart in behind defenders, than to win aerial duels – and it took one such delivery from Charlie Mulgrew to carve out the equaliser.

His stunning, crisp, curler from wide on the left was met by Hooper, who this time made no mistake from close range. The striker was verging on offside, but was given the benefit of the doubt by Euan Norris.

Taken from kerrydalestreet forum

There only looked like there could be one winner from that point given the run of play over the majority of the 90 minutes, but Norris had time to make an extraordinary blunder. After a corner was cleared, Zaliukas’ shot was blocked from point-blank by the elbow of Joe Ledley.

Ledley had no chance to get his arm out of the way, and it was even tucked in to a suitable extent. It’s hard to imagine that the referee could consider it intentional. Complicating matters further, is Ledley’s claim that Norris told the Celtic players at the time, that the shot had hit Wanyama’s arm. This doesn’t alter the fact that the penalty should not have been given, but only serves to emphasise the magnitude of the referee’s blunder.

Beattie, who inspired Hearts’ brief period of dominance just after the interval, fired in the penalty. And just to makes things even more uncomfortable for Norris, Andy Webster survived a very similar hand-ball claim in the Hearts box. It, of course, was never a penalty, but the lack of consistency riled the nearby Celtic support – and Neil Lennon.

It was too late then for Celtic to pull-back another, and Hearts now progress to the final against Hibernian.

Conclusion

Most are content that poor refereeing decisions “even out” over the course of a season. This does require a fantastical faith that there is a footballing God out there divinely evening out competition-changing decisions over as little as 50 matches in a season.

In all 4 competitions this season, Celtic have compelling cases against referees, and while the idea of a conspiracy takes a particular stretch of the imagination (Lennon stated on twitter that he believes the matter is “personal”), there is no doubt that Celtic have been bitterly unlucky.

The trouble, is that for every poor refereeing decision, there’s an equal amount of self-destruction. Gary Hooper shouldn’t have made that challenge against Udinese’s midfielder Isla, albeit, it wasn’t a penalty. What excuse for Cha Du Ri’s moment of madness against Stade Rennais?

In the Communities Cup, specifically against Kilmarnock in the final, Anthony Stokes’ desperate yet convincing appeal for a penalty was quickly denied. But remember the wastefulness – with Hooper’s early miss preceding 85 minutes or so of stodgy lack of ideas.

While the SPL has long been decided, in the biggest matches – the Glasgow Derbies – Celtic have been just as unlucky as guilty of poor performance. Back in September the defence couldn’t cope with Rangers’ route one use of Nikica Jelavic and Kyle Lafferty, and Charlie Mulgrew was rightly sent-off that game. The most recent derby was a different story – with Cha Du Ri’s early dismissal a very harsh decision by the referee. But still no excuse for Sone Aluko’s cheery jaunt through Celtic’s defence or Victor Wanyama’s silly two-footed lunge, and red.

Finally to today’s Scottish FA Cup, where the referee was again central to Celtic’s frustration. Hearts were essentially outplayed for 70 or 80 of the 90 minutes, and with them on the ropes, the referee made his fatal misjudgement.

It is too easy to focus on the referee, like Ledley and Lennon have. It’s particularly ignoring of how effectively Sergio’s plan was implemented. His side were aggressive and defended stoutly. But it’s also ignoring Celtic’s own failings. The inability to capitalise on the overwhelming possession and control of the pitch. Celtic were allowed the ball and asked to do their best – and here, the lone goal wasn’t good enough. A better side would relish the opportunity.

 

Posted in 2011/12, Hearts | 12 Comments

Celtic Vs Hearts Scottish Cup Semi-final – Tactical Preview

Posted on April 14, 2012 by

Celtic take on Hearts at Hampden in the Scottish Cup Semi-final with the Jambos in decent form. They’ve only lost one of the past seven matches, most recently defeating SPL strugglers Dunfermline 2-1 at East End Park.

Paulo Sergio will be concerned by the 9 players currently walking the so-called “suspension tight-rope” – not that that will make a difference to the way his side play their football.

Hearts formation in 2-1 win at Dunfermline 4-2-3-1

Hearts have truly settled on the in vogue, continental 4-2-3-1 formation, with Rudi Skacel typically playing just off the striker.

Hearts’ left-hand side has generally been the most consistent – with Marius Zaliukas, Danny Grainger, Ian Black and Andrew Driver racking up regular gametime together.

While Driver has traditionally been considered the ‘jewel in the crown’, he’s still struggling to reegain the form that caught the eye of bigger sides in the earlier part of his Hearts career. Over the previous two season’s he hasn’t managed more than 14 appearances – but this year looks to be a step forward with the semi-final being his 18th appearance this term.

Hearts’ real star this season has been Ian Black, playing in a “Scott Brown” type role. Primarily a destroyer, but equally expected to rile the opposition, and to a lesser extent create chances. Just watch out for those dirty tackles.

The right hand-side will be more unpredictable, Jamie Hamill has been ruled out, which means Scott Robinson may be shifted central. Ideally, Sergio would prefer a return for Adrian Mrowiec to add more bite and experience to the midfield – though he’s only just returning from injury.

The other option here is Mehdi Taouil who is also returning from injury. But his role his more creative; less of a defensive force, which therefore hinders his chances. On the right David Templeton is back in contention, but again returning from injury may not quite be ready.

And the fourth (well, fifth recovering injuree after Stephen Elliott), may be the most crucial of all. Former Celt Craig Beattie is extremely adept in the lone striker role having excelled in the 3 matches played (scoring two goals) before (rather predictably) succumbing to injury. He’s a more rounded and more experienced player than Elliott or Gary Glen (who is most likely to lead the line) and also has a knack for scoring vital goals.

Celtic Options

Celtic Vs Kilmarnock 4-1-2-1-2 (4-3-3)

Neil Lennon lined up in a surprising (though previously utilised) formation in Celtic’s last match. He went 4-1-2-1-2 verging on an extremely narrow 4-3-3 to combat Kilmarnock’s unique 4-3-2-1.

The only other times that Lennon has utilised such a centrally dependent system had been against sides fielding 3-5-2 formations – simply to match the bodies in central midfield and have belief in the front 3.

It’s an exciting system, especially useful in getting Kris Commons into good positions between the lines – in the number 10 role that Lennon is so keen to embrace.

However – against Hearts expected 4-2-3-1, Lennon’s 4-3-3 is hugely unanticipated. The sole reason being that Celtic’s full-backs will be put in a 2 vs 1 situation in almost every attack. The few teams in world football who use this formation get around the problem by asking a lot of the “sides” of the diamond – requiring them to “shuttle” wide and support their respective full-backs.

Likely starting formation

It will more than likely be a return to the lop-sided 4-4-2, with Commons used as the most advanced midfield. The size and depth of the squad, along with the return of key players from injury, however, makes predicting a lineup more difficult.

Lennon is generally quite lenient on those returning from injury, and likes to keep a winning squad playing – therefore it may simply be a case of shuffling the players who faced Kilmarnock.

Celtic possible 4-4-2

Victor Wanyama’s return from suspension puts pressure on Ki – especially when faced against a side historically aggressive and robust.

Elsewhere, with the ‘Strooper’ combination up front misfiring of late, Anthony Stokes’ best chances of starting will be in place of Gary Hooper.

Arguably Celtic’s best centre-back (since his return from injury mid-season) Thomas Rogne will be looking to usurp Glen Loovens, and what with Charlie Mulgrew’s exceptional performance at left-back last time out, it’s unlikely he will be replaced by the toiling Emilio Izaguirre.

The most likely place of change will be at right-back – where Lennon has historically rotated heavily. Adam Matthews is the most consistent performer, and while Lennon admires Cha Du Ri’s pace and directness, the Korean may have made one mistake too many of late. Mikael Lustig will therefore be hopeful of being granted a start.

Summary

Lennon has already identified Rudi Skacel and Craig Beattie as the dangermen, but there are other, broader worries. The first is the clear numerical deficit in midfield – particularly if Celtic lineup in a flatter shape. Skacel will be spare between the lines, and with his penchant for the spectacular ranged effort, cannot be given room on the edge of the box.

The other main danger is from set-plays (albeit this works both ways, with Celtic’s wealth of quality delivery options). But Hearts have been scoring a lot of goals from set-play crosses – and this is thanks to decent set-piece takers and a tall, strong group of players.

A composed and confident back-line can deal with any such set-piece – so the onus will be on organisation and leadership at the back.

A final word on Celtic: with Georgios Samaras at the top of the game and Kris Commons ever-so-slowly returning to last season’s best, it will be a case of getting the ball down and playing the bright, ambitious attacking football that’s been the source of this season’s best performances.

Posted in 2011/12, Hearts, Match Analysis | Tagged | 1 Comment

Kilmarnock 0 – 6 Celtic: Celtic crowned Champions with diamond performance

Posted on April 7, 2012 by

Celtic are SPL Champions after smashing Kilmarnock 6-0 at Rugby Park. Neil Lennon’s side had to shake off their recent dull form to inflict some kind of revenge following the recent League Cup defeat, fittingly doing the job at the location of this season’s lowest ebb – where Celtic were held to a 3-3 draw in October.

Celtic Lineup

Celtic 4-1-2-1-2 (4-3-3)

It was never likely that the Anthony Stokes / Gary Hooper combination would surive, and so it proved with Stokes dropped for Ki Sung-Yeung, allowing Georgios Samaras to start up front instead.

The surprise though was the formation – a 4-4-2 diamond which could equally be described 4-3-3. It had been a niché system for Lennon, normally prescribed against 3-5-2, but the decision here was to combat Kilmarnock’s very narrow, very midfield heavy 4-3-2-1 – and to take advantage of it’s limitations.

The timing of giving such a centrifugal role to Kris Commons, played just behind the strikers in the number 10 role, has been apt – having nowhere near scaled the heights of the second half of last season. Commons has only now approached that level of attacking menace.

Celtic were quite short in defence, with Victor Wanyama suspended, Emilio Izaguirre still recuperating, Thomas Rogne unable to shake off a knock and Daniel Majstorovic out for the season. The defence therefore practically picked itself (with Adam Matthews being preferred to Cha Du Ri and Mikael Lustig at right-back).

Kilmarnock Lineup

Kilmarnock 4-3-2-1 (4-5-1)


Kenny Sheils hoped to retain as close a system as possible to the one which surprised Celtic in the League Cup final, but with numerous injury concerns had fairly limited options. 

Unfortunately Paul Heffernan couldn’t recover from a thigh injury, meaning Dieter van Tornhout took his place at the peak of the Christmas tree. Elsewhere, Zdenek Kroca, Danny Buijs, Ryan O’Leary, Manuel Pascali, and David Silva (no not that David Silva) are all out.

Explosive start

Celtic came firing out the starting blocks. Of particular significance was the space Commons was finding between the lines (again, almost acting as a 3rd striker), and Mulgrew’s freedom to get forward in possession, and this aggressive opening has been something of a rarity.

In Mulgrew’s case, it was Sheils’ (ambitious) system that allowed such room. Gary Harkins is used in similar fashion to Commons in Celtic’s frequently used “lop-sided” 4-4-2 formation. That is, cutting into the centre of the park, often vacating defensive duty.

Harkins was drawn into an area already comfortably manned by the Celtic defence – Scott Brown the shield/holding midfielder and the two centre-backs who were only dealing with a lone striker.

To be clear – he was Mulgrew’s man. But on the counter Mulgrew had all sorts of licence to get forward. This outnumbering also limited Harkins considerable talent.

This situation where Mulgrew took responsibility for Harkins created an overlap for Celtic elsewhere – Killie’s 3 (or 5) midfielders matched Celtic’s, leaving Commons in a number 10 role the freedom to cause damage.

Why the difference from Killie’s clear “formational” success during the Cup Final? It’s mainly down to Kilmarnock’s full-backs and how they operated.

Commons, Samaras and Hooper took an exagerrated amount of responsibility for tracking back depending on who was on which side. The main emphasis was on Celtic’s right-hand-side, with Ben Gordon a proven threat.

However, Kilmarnock weren’t keen to push a defender forward – managers as a general rule of thumb don’t want to leave 3 vs 3 at the back, never mind against a side who are on paper more talented and with the threat of Samaras’ pace. Also, this again emphasises the importance of Commons – without the ball an extra man in midfield, in possession a 3rd striker, and in general free to roam.

Early goals kill contest

Tactics aside, as is mostly the case for teams trying to contain Celtic, it’s so vital to keep a clean sheet for the opening period. An early goal undermines the defence because you’re forced to “come out of your shell” and the worst happened for Killie after poor defending. Mulgrew found freedom in the box to head in a Ki corner.

It underlines the slender margin between success and failure – compare Hooper’s early miss in the Cup final and the progression of both sides after that point. An exercise in Celtic becoming more and more frustrated, with Killie gaining confidence in inverted proportion.

Contrary to the Final, Kilmarnock were nowhere near as determined, and Mulgrew’s excellent header set the tone for Celtic and the 3 Celtic-saturated stands to grab the initiative.

Apart from opening the scoring, Mulgrew was having a tremendous match – turning provider for the second (a Loovens header after a corner broke down) and then scoring a most sublime individual third. With Harkins having no interest in tracking back, Mulgrew had the freedom to run at opposite full-back James Fowler, cut inside and curl a delightful right-footed shot into the far corner.

Conclusion

By this point it was damage limitation, and Lennon had the peace-of-mind to dripfeed in some young and fresh legs. Brown was replaced by Filip Twardzik in the second half, with Stokes (for Samaras) and Blackman (for Mulgrew) to follow.

For Celtic, it was a day when everything went right – Lennon’s tactics were spot on and a perfect antidote to Sheils’ tricky system. The early goal was scored, and every set-piece was a bona fide danger. Finally, every individual put in a strong performance, and the substitutions were all successful.

Kilmarnock, for some reason or another, have turned out to be something of a barometer in Celtic’s progress this Championship winning season. From the 3-3 nadir,  through to December’s win at home where Celtic had clawed back the 15 point league deficit to just 1.

Then came the Cup Final defeat – evidence that while this young team have come so far, there’s may still remain that soft naivety which must be eradicated before European qualification begins next season.

And then today, after all the troubles it’s a day of triumph and togetherness. A climax to the long journey, with everything going right in almost story-book fashion. A truly stunning performance to match the stunning turnaround in Celtic – and Lennon’s – fortunes.

It’s the final true competitive day of the season, and if Lennon can build on this young and exciting success of a squad, then this really could be just the beginning.

Posted in 2011/12, Kilmarnock | Tagged , | 4 Comments

Celtic 2 – 0 St Johnstone: Celtic leave it late to break down Saints

Posted on April 4, 2012 by

Celtic eventually broke down a resilient St Johnstone side to come within 1 point of securing the SPL title.

Celtic Lineup

Celtic 4-2-2-2

Cha Du Ri and Victor Wanyama were suspended after being sent off in the previous SPL fixture at Ibrox. Mikael Lustig and Gary Hooper were their respective replacements, coming in at right-back and up front respectively.

Ki Sung-Yeung dropped to the bench with Kris Commons coming in on the right hand-side, and Charlie Mulgrew returned to left-back after Adam Matthews torrid time against Rangers, the Welshman dropping to the bench to allow Glen Loovens to start in the centre of defence.

Interestingly Thomas Rogne started his first game in the left centre-back spot, seeing as Loovens isn’t comfortable (isn’t capable of playing?) there.

Lennon opted for a 4-2-2-2 system, having rejected the overly negative 4-5-1 used initially last week.

St Johnstone Lineup

St Johnstone 4-4-2

Steve Lomas had few injury concerns – Murray Davidson missed out thanks to a knee injury and left-back Callum Davidson couldn’t recover from a hamstring issue.

The big question was whether ex-Celt Derek Riordan would be ready to make the match squad following his free signing at the weekend – and the answer (almost disappointingly) was no. Elsewhere, loannee James Keatings wasn’t allowed to feature against his parent club.

Open match – few chances

With Lomas sticking to his preferred 4-4-2 formation, there were personal battles all over the park. This also meant no natural ‘free’ players for either side, making for a scrappy first-half. One player bucking the trend and breaking forward was Samaras – whose performances have been impressive of late, but also Commons was getting in on the act (albeit lacking the final pass).

The same could not be said for the Hooper/Stokes partnership up front, although Stokes did link up with Commons for one of the clearest cut chances of the half. Stokes delayed his pass expertly, releasing Commons who drilled his shot wide when he should’ve hit the target.

Apart from frustrating with the man-to-man approach, the Saints (like Rangers before) were defending with little vertical ‘depth’. Between the defensive lines and forwards couldn’t have been more than a quarter of the length of the pitch – making it extremely difficult for Celtic to play deck football. And again like the Glasgow derby, with wide midfielders determined to cut inside, the “active” football playing area was very congested.

Furthermore – the Saints strikers were dropping so deep as to actually press Celtic’s midfielders (rather than bother with the centre-backs).

Good spell from visitors prompts change

With the score tied at 0-0 and Celtic poor all the way through the first-half, the inevitable sustained pressure from the Saints (along with the inevitable Celtic lethargy) arrived early in the second half. The source was the height and movement of Sandaza andSheridan- with their midfield told to whip in crosses low, hard and most significantly early – before the defence were comfortably organised. It’s an excellent way to take advantage of ball-watchers, although the strikers were required to be sharp, to explosively cover ground (between the back-line and ‘keeper), and to gamble. Both forwards had decent opportunities in such circumstance.

The question for Lennon was – how to shake up the team? The only bright spark (of the front 6) was Samaras with the others equally tepid.

Lop-sided 4-4-2

He decided to bring on Ki for Stokes – moving Samaras alongside Hooper, and the formation changing from 4-2-2-2 to the ‘lop-sided’ 4-4-2. With the Greek “in one of those moods” and now closer to goal, he could really hurt the Saints defence. Irritated as much by his own teams inadequacy as an opposition challenge, Samaras doggedly drew out a foul – like a good targetman should. Commons whipped in the cross from the left, leaving Samaras to finish what he started – with Sheridan at fault, not paying attention.

Celtic’s moving up of Commons exposed St Johnstone’s own 4-4-2 – a system which has the inherent weakness of space between the lines. And now Commons could find space (as opposed to when double-marked out wide).

Celtic’s goal also spelled the end for Lomas’ plan – the defending (very) deep, hitting on the break and via set-pieces, and hoping to take a chance and sneak a goal. His side now needed to press ever forward, opening more space for Celtic to exploit. This was typified in the killer second, and credit has to go to Ki for his decision making. Taking the ball into his stride in the final third, he helped create an overlap by motioning in to shoot. This opened up space for Samaras out wide, whose cross-cum-shot was turned in by Millar.

Conclusion

The mid-match slump is a passage of play typical of Celtic’s latter form – and fortunate teams like Rangers, Kilmarnock and Aberdeen have taken advantage. In this case, Celtic finally got their own share of fortune, capitalising onSheridan’s really poor defending for a simple goal from set-piece. Lomas was further aggrieved in the buildup to Celtic’s second, where he correctly felt Craig was impeded by Commons. The solution is to remove the influence of luck (and alternatively referees) as much as possible – something Lennon’s side currently are not doing.

Much of Celtic’s recent problems have come from a lack of firepower up front – coinciding with the loss/breaking down of (POTY contender) James Forrest. With Samaras clearly man of the match (winning the free-kick for, and scoring the first and forcing the O.G. for the second) it’s therefore a testing time for the ‘Stooper’ combination. On-form, it’s an exciting and technical combination – but over the course of the season it’s proven too easy a pairing to inhibit.

The successful switch to the ‘lop-sided’ 4-4-2 along with a semi-resurgent Commons further backs the idea of dropping of one of Hooper or (more likely) Stokes.

This goes back to a problem that has existed for as long as Lennon has been manager – despite a numerically healthy squad in general, there are still clear weaknesses in depth in specific areas: if Samaras is now considered a left-winger, then there are two (target-man type) striker slots available. And aside from Forrest this season, no creative/attacking midfielder has really shone (apart from Samaras, again, whose position isn’t really clear yet).

 

 

Posted in 2011/12, St Johnstone | Tagged , | 1 Comment

Rangers 3 – 2 Celtic: Rangers benefit from poor Celtic & early red card

Posted on March 27, 2012 by

With the league title all but wrapped up, Neil Lennon hadn’t experienced a more “meaningless” Glasgow derby since his very first attempt as manager back in 2010. These encounters are so often decided by (the old cliché) – who ‘wants it more’. Celtic, jaded, lacked the motivation displayed by the hosts and while nothing tangible was at stake, the performance could still be considered fairly impermissible. The chance to make history at Ibrox, as frivolous a chance it may be, slipped by.

Celtic Lineup

Celtic

Celtic 4-5-1

Celtic were without long-term absentees Glen Loovens, Daniel Majstorovic and Beram Kayal, but the biggest news was James Forrest’s failure to recover from the injury sustained at Hampden the previous weekend.

Instead of utilising either Emilio Izaguirre, Charlie Mulgrew or Joe Ledley at left-back, Adam Matthews came in. Kelvin Wilson and Gary Hooper dropped to the bench, with Cha Du Ri coming in at right-back.

Fully expecting a five-man opposition midfield, Lennon matched up with Samaras starting on the left alongside four central midfielders.

Rangers Lineup

Rangers 4-1-4-1

Ally McCoist welcomed back an entire back four, after defeat last week to Dundee Utd. This allowed Rhys McCabe to begin as a holding midfielder, and Lee McCulloch to make something of a shock start up front.

It was a shift away from McCoist’s generally preferred 4-2-3-1, aiming to pack the midfield and push high up the park minimising the gap between the defensive line and the lone forward.

Rangers take upper hand

Going back to the motivation theme, it was clear from the outset that Rangers were taking advantage of numerous psychological bonuses – the home advantage, the biting desire to avoid the unspeakable, but most significantly of all was Celtic’s initial apathy. Perhaps it was the lack of seasoned veterans (Scott Brown aside) perhaps it was the unfamiliar formation, but Rangers – and their meticulously compact depth – were bossing the early possession.

From the outset, Celtic’s tactics weren’t helping. When deployed on either side, it’s the signature of both Brown and Samaras to cut-in rather than providing width (and therefore space). Rangers exacerbated the congestion by playing a high back-line – which didn’t suit Celtic. Stokes, as lone striker looked to break the offside trap but generally doesn’t have the pace, wasn’t provided decent enough service and probably most importantly – couldn’t catch a break.

Rangers were therefore free to push up, get the ball to McCulloch, and get Sone Aluko free between Celtic’s fairly flat lines.

It was this space (and apathy) that allowed Aluko to escape Ki’s casual meandering, being able to run at Rogne at pace, and score a goal somewhere between fantastic and fortunate.

Both sides respond to opener

Lennon was the first to twitch, making the decision to push Samaras alongside Stokes – providing breathing room in the midfield and also aiming to exploit the high defensive line with genuine pace. The disadvantage was removing arguably Celtic’s only true “attacking” midfielder, and probably removed Samaras from his most effective position.

Rangers 3-5-2 - 12 minutes on

McCoist responded instantly, with a fairly easy and natural transition to a formation straight out of Walter Smith’s playbook. It’s well established that a 3-man defence isn’t best suited to facing a lone striker, so this switch looked to be a planned riposte to Celtic’s 4-4-2.

While making a mini-resurgence in World football (or at least Italy, having largely died out in the mid and late noughties) the 3-5-2 is usually considered a niche defensive system – as it can be so open to exploitation (through 4-3-3).

In both of McCoist’s iterations, the clear emphasis was on shutting down Celtic’s midfield, and with the numerical advantage Rangers could achieve this with ease.

The flip-side – the spacial advantage for Celtic - would have to come from the full-backs.

Dueling full-backs

With Brown and Ledley so keen to come in to the central midfield stramash, this left a 1 v 1 situation on either flank. Cha vs Wallace and Matthews vs Whittaker. It’s a vast area of ground to cover, but being a goal behind, the onus was on Celtic to press the issue (and another reminder of how crucial Izaguirre once was). It’s a straight up battle of stamina and will – if you let your man go, it’s an automatic overlap.

This is where Cha was exposed – with Celtic losing possession in Rangers half, Wallace made a gut-bursting charge into essentially a vacant right-back area. Cha trailling, and overtly at fault in losing his man, he pulled back Wallace prompting a controversial red-card decision. The term “clear goal-scoring chance” has been bandied around, but Wallace wasn’t guaranteed finding possession, or even guaranteed a shot at goal from a reasonable angle. It was a tenuous “clear” chance, but Murray produced the red-card.

Stokes sacrificed

Between Samaras and Stokes, it was the latter withdrawn for Emilio Izaguirre who went to left-back (and Matthews going right-back). Samaras is quite simply a more natural lone forward – better in the air and more mobile, so the choice was correct.

Rangers now had a 3 v 1 in defence, allowing Papac to return to left-back, making for a lop-sided 3-5-2

It left Whittaker largely one-on-one with Izaguirre, but faced with 2 forwards Celtic’s substitute was more reluctant to get forward (leaving Mulgrew exposed) – which gave Whittaker the advantage and freedom to get forward.

This was not entirely unrelated to Whittaker drawing the real killer blow. Having the freedom to cut inside, into Wanyama’s domain, the Kenyan made a lazy two-footed lunge which this time was a clear-cut sending off. Having struggled to support Samaras with 10 against 11, the game looked over.

Late goal flurry

Celtic could only play 4-3-1, completely relinquishing the space on the flanks – and McCoist eventually responded by going 4-2-3-1 (bearing in mind the aforementioned pointlessness in 3 centre-backs versus 1 striker). An inswinging cross from the advancing Whittaker was eventually prodded in by substitute Andy Little, and for the third were caught vastly outnumbered on the counter-attack, Wallace made it 3. With Celtic forced to chase the game, a counter-attack was a continual threat.

Celtic deserve credit for fighting back – and surely exhausted after 89 minutes, there was enough energy left for Samaras to win a penalty (earning Bocanegra a red card). And minutes late, Rogne headed in another – but it was too little too late.

Conclusion

The 3-2 scoreline is a strange one. It reveals not only how poorly Celtic performed for 85+ minutes but how vulnerable Rangers were to full-blooded attacks.

While it’s easy to blame the referee for what was surely an incorrect early red-card decision, it’s impossible to get away from Celtic’s performance – their hunger. It’s another black-eye for Lennon – another “big” match squandered. It is his job after all, to motivate and inspire, and to get the tactics correct from the outset.

Questions have to be asked of the fringes of the burgeoning squad. The lineup suggested a lack of quality wide players (the evidence being a starting XI containing 4 central midfielders). It’s a poor reflection on Commons, Efrain Juarez , Paddy McCourt and especially Cha, and to a lesser extent McGeouch, Izaguirre and Rabiu Ibrahim.

It’s unfair to be too critical of Lennon – delivering the first title after 3 failed campaigns and a berth in the semi-final of the Scottish Cup. It’s also a revolution still on the rise – with the unprecedented young squad still a work in progress. But with a difficult competition still to be won and an incredibly important summer ahead, the weary recent performances – and lack of attacking verve – has to be addressed.

Posted in 2011/12, Rangers | Tagged , , | 6 Comments